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Abstract: There are numerous ways in which to model the underlying theory of pro­
grams. In the context of international development evaluation, the most ubiquitous 
are likely “logframes” and to some extent “theories of change,” both of which may 
serve to guide program development and management, monitoring, and evalua­
tion. While logframes and theories of change are often developed in parallel, they 
are rarely fully integrated in their practical application. Drawing on lessons from a 
recent theory-based evaluation, this article argues that fully integrating the program 
theory of change within the program logframe provides for a stronger and more 
holistic understanding of program progress. 
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 The logframe has been ever present in development circles since its adoption 
and promotion by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
the early 1970s. Informed by a review of USAID’s evaluation system, the logframe 
was originally developed as a tool to help conceptualize a project and analyze 
the assumptions behind it (Rosenberg & Posner, 1979). Since then, the logical 
framework approach has undergone cosmetic changes and shifts in terminology; 
however, its primary purpose remains intact: to demonstrate how parts of a pro­
gram fit together, neatly and logically, and how a series of program activities will 
lead to a specific set of program objectives (however we chose to define these). Th e 
logframe approach has in many instances proven extremely valuable for project 
design, planning, implementation, management, monitoring, and evaluation and 
is now widely used by bilateral and multilateral development agencies as the de 
facto program-management tool (Bamberger, Rugh, & Mabry, 2012; Hummelb­
runner, 2010; Prinsen & Nijhof, 2015). The sustained dominance of logframes in 
international development is illustrated in the UK Department for International 
Development guidelines for funding applicants, which require that “all newly 
approved projects regardless of project value must also now contain a logframe” 
(DFID, 2011, p. 2). 
 The logframe, when it is designed and used as intended, works well as a 
monitoring tool to assess program progress against predefined objectives. One 
central limitation, however, is that logframes often focus on short- and medium-
term objectives, as opposed to detailing how these lead to long-term changes 
(Bamberger et al., 2012; Channell, 2005). In extension, another limitation is that 
logframes by design do not provide information on how or why program objec­
tives were reached (or not reached). As  Eyben, Kidder, Rowlands, and Bronstein 
(2008 ) observe, the “linear cause-effect thinking” inherent to logframes fails to 
capture the complexity of the change processes underlying most development 
programs. Herein lies one of the significant assumptions of logframes that has not 
done evaluation any favours: it is assumed that the logic laid out in the logframe’s 
progressive steps holds true and that an achievement of the program objectives is 
proof that the program is working according to this logic. This assumption, while 
seemingly trivial, comes with great consequences, as it leaves the inner workings 
of how and in what way the program achieves the stated objectives undisclosed 
and unexamined. 
In marked contrast, a theory of change (ToC), also known as program theory, 
centers exactly on the inner workings of programs (Connell & Kubisch, 1998). 
Emerging from the “tradition of logic planning models,” such as the logical frame­
work approach, the purpose of the ToC is to make explicit how specifi c program 
activities lead to specific outputs, which in turn lead to a specified set of outcomes 
(Stein & Valters, 2012, p. 5). Moreover, ToCs—at least the better ones—oft en con­
sider the external environment of the program and then places the program and 
its activities within this context, determining how these activities might interact 
with influencing factors in the broader environment or to what extent compet­
ing programs might complement or in some other way influence the program 
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activities and outcomes (see Mayne, 2012, for a discussion on “embedded” theo­
ries of change). 
In providing a more detailed explication of the inner workings of programs, 
ToCs potentially remedy the limitations associated with logframes described 
above. For one, ToCs bring attention to the long-term impact of programs, 
specifying how short- and medium-term outcomes of the development pro­
gram are at least intended to bring about long-term changes ( Prinsen & Nijhof, 
2015 ). This long-term line-of-sight may potentially serve well to counter the all-
too-common pressure among project managers to focus almost exclusively on 
monitoring and reporting on short-term program progress (Imas & Rist, 2009; 
Prinsen & Nijhof). Moreover, and in direct relation to logframes, “theory of 
change thinking,” by explicating how specific program activities lead to specifi c 
outcomes, may serve “to bridge the ‘missing middle’ that the log-frame hides” 
(Vogel, 2012, p. 19). 
As the preceding paragraphs illustrate, logframes and theories of change 
potentially complement and even enhance one another. Unfortunately, and 
while many development programs involve both a logframe and a theory of 
change as part of their performance-management framework, the integration 
of these potentially complementary tools is often challenging (Vogel, 2012). 
Accordingly, and as Prinsen and Nijhof (2015 ) conclude, “work remains to be 
done in  order to find ways to optimise the combined use of the logframe and 
ToC in programming” (p. 244). 
Speaking directly to this call, this article makes the case for more purposeful 
integration of the design and use of logframes and ToCs. More specifi cally, we 
argue that integrating these tools in program planning and evaluation enhances 
both the quantitative measures that are often the ambit of the logframe and the 
“story of the program,” which, when it is told, often relies heavily on the ToC. 
We assert that by developing and using the two tools as complementary, from 
project inception to final evaluation, we will be able to record and relay a more 
holistic view of the program¾not only what it has achieved but also how this was 
accomplished. 
Toward this end, toward advancing further integration, we formulate fi ve 
steps for how this integration might work by way of a recent real-world case 
example. These steps are not intended as sure-fire recipes for success to be un­
critically adopted in other settings and contexts. Indeed, this type of mechanistic 
application cuts against the grain of what we aim for: more thoughtful and pur­
poseful integration of logframes and theories of change. The modest aim of the 
five steps is simply to motivate further interest and to support further work on 
this important topic. 
 The article is structured as follows. In the first part, we consider the promises 
and perils of logframes and ToCs when designed and considered individually, 
followed by an examination of the underlying reasons that logframes and ToCs 
tend not to be fully integrated in their practical application. Informed by this 
examination, in the second part of the article, we then consider a real-world case 
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example of how logframes and ToCs might be integrated in the context of inter­
national development settings and outline five steps that can be applied to further 
this integration process. 
THE PARALLEL PROMISES AND PERILS OF LOGFRAMES 
AND THEORIES OF CHANGE
 Logical frameworks 
Since the 1970s, logical frameworks have become commonplace in international 
development (Rosenberg & Posner, 1979). Reflecting their wide application, logi­
cal frameworks have been referred to by many different labels, most commonly 
“logframe” and “logframe matrix” (Bamberger et al., 2012). In its practical appli­
cation, a logframe is ideally developed during the program design and planning 
stages, with revisions made throughout the implementation of the program. Th e 
logframe matrix typically takes the form of a four-by-four table, with rows for 
program components (activities, output, outcome, and goals) and columns for 
measurement information (program summary, indicators, means of verifi cation, 
and risks/assumptions). A generic logframe matrix is presented in Table 1. Given 
the wide use of logframes, as well as their adaptation to preferences within diff er­
ent government and donor organizations, these categories may of course vary, but 
the matrix in Table 1 displays the generic structure. 
 There are many potential benefits of using logframes. If designed and imple­
mented well, the logframe matrix may support program planning, management, 
and monitoring. As a management approach, the logframe matrix may also serve 
as the overarching overview and work plan for the program, guiding program 
implementation and management (Imas & Rist, 2009). As a monitoring tool, the 
logframe may support logical framework analysis by establishing salient activities, 
outputs, and outcomes to be monitored; by connecting these with measurable in­
dicators; and by identifying plausible risks and assumptions ( Imas & Rist ). Th ese 
are but a few of the many benefits of logframes. 
Despite its many benefits, however, concerns and challenges about logframes 
have been raised on multiple occasions (Gasper, 1997, 2000a; Fujita, 2010). One 
common criticism is that the logframe approach promotes short-term program 
Table 1: Generic logframe matrix 
 Summary  Indicators  Means of verification  Risks/assumptions 
Goals 
 Objectives 
Outputs 
 Activities 
doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53007 CJPE 33.3, 336–353 © 2019 
340 Freer and Lemire 
objectives, even if these are counter to long-term impact ( Channell, 2005; Perrin, 
2003; Rogers, 2008). Any reader who has worked with logframes, either reporting 
against it as a program management tool or trying to assess a program though 
the logframe lens, will likely have thought (perhaps even aloud) about this po­
tential conflict. To be sure, and especially when used in isolation, a logframe can 
potentially result in perverse incentives and a focus on shorter-term achievements 
rather than on more distant outcomes, often obscuring contextual learning (Bam­
berger et al., 2012; Gasper, 2000b). As Channell observes, 
Contractors fail when they do not meet various requirements for deliverables under 
their contracts with donor agencies. ... A contractor can be completely successful ... 
even if full performance has resulted in negligible benefits. (p. 17) 
Moreover, and in part because the logframes are often structured around con­
tractually obligated program objectives, logframes tend to remain static and not 
updated, running the risk over time of becoming a restricting “lock frame” for 
program learning and development (Gasper, 1997, 2000b). 
Another distinct—yet related—limitation is that logframes by design do not 
provide information on how program objectives were reached (or not reached); 
the inner workings of how the program is intended to achieve the stated ob­
jectives are left undisclosed and unexamined (Eyben et al., 2008; Imas & Rist, 
2009 ). Th e simplified “linear cause-effect thinking” inherent to logframes fails 
to capture the complexity of change processes underlying most development 
programs—what Gasper (2000b ) pointedly refers to as a “lack-frame.” Th is is­
sue exists in part because a logframe will describe “how much” but not “how” 
program outcomes are achieved. In the same way, the dashboard of a car indi­
cates how fast the vehicle is travelling, how much fuel is left, how far you have 
travelled, and whether the engine is overheating; if you had a series of snapshots 
of the car dashboard, you would have a similar set of information—at this time, 
the car was travelling at this speed and had this amount of fuel. However, the 
dashboard would not (and could not) tell you how or why you travelled a spe­
cific route, which landmarks you passed, the reason for the direction you were 
travelling, or why you decided on the highway or a more scenic route. For that 
you need a different piece of equipment. 
Theories of change 
 Theories of change speak directly to this information need. Initially introduced 
in the context of community-change initiatives (Connell & Kubisch, 1998), and 
now widely used both inside and outside international development evaluation, 
the theory of change approach has and continues to be defined and deployed 
in many different ways (see James, 2011; Stein & Valters, 2012; Vogel, 2012, for 
comprehensive reviews of ToC practices in international development settings). If 
we scan across this conceptual diversity, we can see that the term usually refers to 
both a  process and a  product, focusing on making explicit how program activities 
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and outputs are intended to bring about a specifi ed set of outcomes ( Connell & 
Kubisch ;  Vogel ). As  Vogel observes, 
Some people view it as a tool and methodology to map out the logical sequence 
of an initiative from inputs to outcomes. Other people see it as a deeper refl ective 
process and dialogue amongst colleagues and stakeholders, reflecting on the values, 
worldviews and philosophies of change that make more explicit people’s underlying 
assumptions of how and why change might happen as an outcome of the initiative. 
Theory of change is at its best when it combines both approaches. (p. 3) 
In both process and product, the ToC specifies how specific program components 
(activities and outputs) lead to a specific set of desired outcomes ( Connell & 
Kubisch ). The better ones also include contextual conditions—within which the 
program is embedded—that may depress or enhance the ability of the program to 
generate the desired outcomes ( Mayne, 2012). While there is no single format for 
a ToC, a generic version is for illustrative purposes provided in Figure 1. As the 
figure illustrates, a ToC depicts how specific program activities by way of specifi c 
program outputs connect with specific program outcomes. The connections, in 
the figure depicted as arrows, are in the form of assumptions, that is, hypothesized 
connections to be verified empirically ( Connell & Kubisch ;  Mayne ). Considered 
collectively, these components comprise the underlying logic of the program. In 
addition, the figure also indicates that ToCs may include contextual conditions 
(influencing factors) that may serve to enhance or depress the program outcomes. 
If designed and implemented well, ToCs can be a potentially rich source of 
information regarding a program’s progress, intended and unintended outcomes, 
and causal relationships (Vogel, 2012; White, 2009). By detailing how specifi c 
C 
O 
N 
T 
E 
X 
T 
Activity 1 
Activity 2 
Activity 3 
Activity 4 
Output 1 
Outcome 1 
Output 1 
Outcome 2 
Outcome 3 
 Figure 1 : Generic theory of change 
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activities and outputs lead to specific outcomes, the ToC supports a more fi ne-
grained analysis and understanding of how and why the program brings about 
the desired outcomes (or even fails to do so). As Bamberger et al. (2012 ) observe, 
ToCs may serve well to establish the most central program activities and out­
comes, to identify the critical assumptions (“links”) on which the success of the 
program is contingent, and, by extension, to guide what subsequent evaluation 
resources should be allocated. These are all worthwhile benefits. 
 The ToC, however, is not without limitations. In the context of international 
development, one commonly observed shortcoming is the initial development 
of vague and too generic theories of change (James, 2011; Vogel, 2012). Th ere 
might be several reasons for this issue, including the difficult task of striking the 
appropriate balance between the perceived need for simplicity and the real-world 
context of program complexity, an admittedly difficult task (James ). Another 
reason may emerge from the challenging nature of making explicit and detailing 
the wide range of assumptions underlying complex programs ( Vogel ). As experi­
enced by Prinsen and Nijhof (2015 ), it is not uncommon for developers of ToCs 
to miss steps, to omit key assumptions, or simply to fail to acknowledge salient 
risks or other contextual conditions. Regardless of the reason, the implication of 
developing an overly simplified theory of change is that it reduces its ability to 
serve as the guiding rod for the program planning and implementation, which in 
turn results in a lack of interest and commitment to the ToC among implementers 
and decision makers—the practical value of the theory of change is depressed. 
Another shortcoming emerges from the common conflation of thinking of 
the make up and purpose of a theory of change (Freer & Lemire, 2016). When 
the underlying design and purpose of a theory of change are not well understood, 
or perhaps even misunderstood, the subsequent use of the ToC—by evaluators to 
gather data or by program staff as a tool to inform decisions—is also likely to be 
misapplied. This leaves decision makers, who are often searching for data regard­
ing program progress and direction, without a nuanced, contextual understanding 
of program’s current position. A disconnect emerges between the information 
called for by the ToC and the information called for by the program staff . 
We also suggest that a third shortcoming might lie in the understanding 
and capacity of the program staff who are used to institutional reporting against 
quantifiable objectives, and where success is measured against the achievement 
or overachievement of these same objectives. Alternative measures of program 
implementation or outcomes, even if relevant and quantifiable, are in this context 
less likely to be promoted, pursued, and monitored. Programs are not assessed on 
their rate of failure or their innovativeness in overcoming challenges, in spite of 
donors’ and funders’ repeated verbal acknowledgement that they want to learn 
from failure and challenges (Channell, 2005). In our own experience of asking 
program staff to unpack why a course of action might not have been taken, or why 
program progress has fallen short of the anticipated objectives, there is an initial 
defensive attitude to the lack of progress or failure to achieve identifi ed objectives. 
Moreover, it takes time and effort to understand why certain options were not 
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chosen over others, and these decisions are often not recorded in detail. Regular 
revision of a ToC might assist in capturing these decisions; however, the develop­
ment and subsequent revisions of a ToC can be time-consuming, and over time, 
at least from a program resource perspective, can become a grudge investment. 
 These are but a few select challenges. Considered collectively, however, and in 
our experience, these challenges—lack of specificity, lack of clear purpose, and a 
too narrow focus on program objectives—often leave the full potential of theories 
of change more talked about than realized. 
The limited interplay between logframes and theories of change 
Despite the seemingly obvious complementarity between logframes and theories 
of change, the potential benefits of their integration are rarely realized. While 
in the design phase programs are often required to develop both, rarely does a 
program call on one of the tools to support the other. As such, programs tend to 
forget about their potential mutuality: one as an internal focal guide and the other 
as a point of reference in a wider environment. The position we hold is that the 
underlying reasons for the limited integration of logframes and theories of change 
are rooted in conceptual conflation of the tools, the parallel ways in which the 
tools are developed and designed, and the differing purposes in their subsequent 
implementation. 
For one, the similarities and distinctions between logframes and ToCs are not 
always clear (James, 2011; Vogel, 2012). As  Vogel documents in her review of ToC 
practice in international development, “People fi nd difficult to separate theory 
of change from the familiar logframe .... This is not surprising, as ... they come 
from the same family of approaches, programme theory” (p. 19). Th e intertwined 
intellectual roots, combined with the shared focus on describing the underlying 
logic of programs, lead to conceptual conflation of logframes and ToCs. Echoing 
this conceptual confusion, some practitioners come to view theories of change as 
“glorified logframes” (James , p. 10). 
Another reason for this is to be found in the parallel ways in which program 
theories and logframes are often developed. In some cases, individuals who are 
no longer part of the program team might have developed the individual tools, 
perhaps as part of securing program funding, while program managers and staff 
are subsequently asked to deliver on and report against them (Prinsen & Nijhof, 
2015). In these situations, those implementing the program are oft en presented 
with both tools as completed items, outlining the ideal program implementation 
as envisioned in the early program-design stage. While there might be an evident 
logic, which can be read into each tool; nuances and detail, which might have 
formed part of the initial conceptualization, including connections between the 
two tools, can easily be lost, as the tools become parallel artefacts of historical 
thinking (Fujita, 2010). 
Moreover, and even if the development of logframes and theories of change 
are conceptually distinct and aligned in their development, the tools are in their 
subsequent practical applications perceived as serving different roles and of 
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reporting against different aspects of a program. As documented by James (2011), 
“many use theory of change to explore their organisation or programme at a 
broader level—to develop an overall vision and understanding of change—and 
then use logframes to defi ne specific projects” (p. 10). The tools come to serve the 
professed needs of specific audiences, who might use them for diff erent purposes. 
Even when drafted as complementary, the tools tend to develop in diff erent direc­
tions, with different stakeholders with different purposes, growing increasingly 
apart and rarely reunited (Prinsen & Nijhof, 2015). 
Even in rare cases where the tools have been developed in a symbiotic pro­
cess, this overlap and mutual reinforcement might not be easily understood or 
realized in the subsequent separation and use of each as stand-alone tools. Rather 
than trying to uncover any lost mysteries, the program-implementation team is 
caught up in the busyness of delivering the program and, when required, simply 
dust off the program’s theory of change to show that the process remains true to its 
original calling—a ritualistic exercise. Invariably the tool that is most oft en used 
for external communication of program progress becomes the logframe, which 
displays or contains aspects that are most easily explained. In an attempt to explain 
progress, the program resorts to the quantifiable and focuses on logframe results. 
Indeed, this is the “go-to” reporting point for donors of the program as well—how 
best to assess the success of a program than by determining how close it is to 
quantifiable targets. As a result, the program staff, the donors or funders, and 
others within the development community lose a rich layer of analysis of how 
the program is working in context as well as the implementation infl uences and 
influencers (Freer & Lemire, 2016; Mayne, 2012). 
By extension, and in the use of these tools in bridging data and decision mak­
ing within the program, the differing purposes are further attenuated. In many 
situations, as evaluators, we limit ourselves to gathering data from the logframe as 
it contains more quantifiable data, and the success or failure of the program is so 
often assessed on this basis. A theory of change—while intended as such—is rarely 
regarded as an interim reporting tool, with occasional final evaluations asking for 
a review of the ToC, assuming there was one at inception. Using the logframe as 
an interim reporting tool without regularly consulting or reviewing the ToC is 
comparable to thinking, “As long as I maintain this speed, I should reach my des­
tination,” disregarding the fact that you may be heading in the wrong direction or 
running low on fuel, finally thinking, “How did I end up here?” In taking this step, 
we assume that the initial logic underpinning the logframe continues to hold true, 
an all-too-oft en flawed assumption within the dynamic and fl uid implementation 
environments of international development. 
In practice, then, programs often end up with two stand-alone tools that 
are separate in their purpose, design, and application, whereby their mutually 
reinforcing integration is easily forgotten and lost. Whether because of a lack of 
understanding regarding the initial design or purpose of the tools, or because of 
a lack of appreciation of the tools’ potential complementarity in implementation, 
the program’s reporting and its evaluation are all the poorer for this situation, 
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being able to report on two, related program stories when a single, integrated, and 
more comprehensive tale could be told. 
 This lack of integration comes with a number of consequences, of which two 
real-world examples will be provided. As one illustrative example, and as we expe­
rienced on a recent evaluation, the lack of integration may lead to fervent pursuit 
and progress toward quantifi able targets that might not refl ect the development 
ethos of the overall program. Those involved in a market development program 
that was being evaluated, committed to a specific development methodology, real­
ized that they were falling behind in their women-related targets. Th e logframe 
specified that the program reach a specific number of women within the stated 
timeframe. To their credit, the program management called for assistance and 
developed a gender strategy specific to their needs. However, it later emerged 
that while these activities contributed to the overall women-specifi c program 
targets, there was often weak adherence to the required development methodol­
ogy. As evaluators we raised a few concerns, especially around the methodological 
commitment of the program. How did this situation arise? For a few reasons: the 
original women target appeared to have little basis in the contextual reality of the 
program, and in pursuing quantifiable targets, the program paid less attention to 
the quality of the impact, as required by the methodology. A well-draft ed theory 
of change, speaking to the logframe targets, might have given voice to this concern 
in the program design phase, and definitely in an early program review, when the 
shortfall in the women-related target became obvious. Making use of the ToC 
as a reporting tool might also have provided more detail on the methodology of 
the women-specific activities, leading to questions and discussion around their 
rationale. These types of deliberations, grounded in the interplay between the log-
frame and the theory of change, could have served well to inform future iterations 
of the program, potentially making it more effective and effi  cient. 
Another recent evaluation by Freer also serves well to illustrate the severe 
implications that may emerge from a lack of purposeful integration of logframes 
and theories of change. In this instance, the program was an innovative, iterative 
learning opportunity, funded by a range of donors, all of whom had agreed and 
signed off on its purpose and design. In its implementation, however, the intran­
sigence of the logframe and the relative impotency of the theory of change were 
revealed. In the evaluation process it was discovered that while the innovativeness 
of program partners was part of the selection process, a number of partners were 
specifi cally identified due to their potential to substantially contribute to program 
targets. The theory of change was regarded as peripheral to this point, stating 
broad objectives and general process steps and providing very little detail of these 
real challenges faced by the program. This was a concrete example of an innovative 
program “playing safe” and, having realized its program targets, three-quarters of 
the way though implementation, broadened its selection criteria and identifi ed 
partners that spoke to innovation, risk, and invention rather than to scale and nu­
merical, target-dictated achievement. While the program moved toward and was 
committed to innovation and learning to this point, the realized freedom from 
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logframe targets allowed program implementers to wholeheartedly pursue their 
envisaged ideal. A collaborative use of both tools in a mutually supportive manner 
might have provided the program implementers with a more flexible approach to 
selection of program partners or allowed them to report on qualitative indicators 
or on a range of quantitative metrics, in lieu of quantitative specifi cs. 
From our perspective, then, there are several noteworthy reasons why a more 
purposeful integration of logframes and theories of change should be pursued. 
Integrating these tools in program planning and evaluation enhances both the 
quantitative measures that are often the ambit of the logframe and the “story of 
the program,” which, when it is told, often relies heavily on the theory of change. 
Indeed, the value-added by integrating logframes and ToC more explicitly is what 
motivates this article. To understand what these benefits are and, perhaps more 
importantly, how these might be achieved, we now turn our attention to a recent 
theory-based evaluation, where program logframe and the theory of change were 
integrated. 
MAKING THE CASE FOR A STRONGER INTEGRATION OF 
LOGFRAMES AND THEORIES OF CHANGE: LESSONS 
LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Freer is currently acting as evaluator on a development program focusing on 
regional water infrastructure crossing a number of international borders. Th e 
infrastructure is under the control of several national and international bodies, all 
of whom need to cooperate to ensure effi  cient operations. The program is working 
with this wide range of parties to ensure that the water infrastructure is mutually 
beneficial, well maintained, and efficiently operated, and to guide these bodies to 
use it to achieve developmental goals, such as contributing toward gender equal­
ity and poverty alleviation. The evaluation seeks to determine how and to what 
extent the program manages to achieve this rather ambitious developmental goal. 
As part of the initial design process, the evaluation team was tasked with re­
focusing the suggested logframe and designing a program theory of change. Th is 
was done in collaboration with the day-to-day program staff and managers. In this 
process, the tools were developed in a synergistic manner, where changes in one 
tool influenced changes and alterations in the other. This was done deliberately 
by trying to determine, as just one example, how the ToC might be able to verify 
information on the number of beneficiaries, a key objective in the logframe. Simi­
larly, the evaluation team tried to determine where the logframe might record data 
that spoke more directly to specific causal relationships, such as changes in opera­
tional or strategic focus, reflecting possible program influence. In discussions with 
the program donors, very few changes were approved to the logframe design, but 
this still allowed Freer to record this process within the ToC—that changes were 
suggested but rejected—and, as a result, the program has been obligated to follow 
a particular route to its outcomes. Freer is currently reviewing both the logframe 
and the ToC as part of the program’s first year of implementation. 
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The one-year review speaks directly to the need for a stronger integration 
between the logframe and the ToC for several reasons. As mentioned above, the 
water infrastructure program works with a range of institutions with different 
needs and varying capacities. While the logframe simply requires a quantifi­
able indicator as proof of progress, an initial draft of the ToC did not recognize 
the nuances of these institutions, suggesting that all institutions would be en­
gaged in the same manner. A year into the program, Freer recognized that the 
institutional differences require subtly different, distinct steps, and as a result, 
when in providing evidence against the quantifiable indicator, the evaluation 
will be able to demonstrate these. A revised draft of the ToC takes these dis­
tinctions into account. In a similar vein, these institutional differences might 
require a refining of the logframe targets. The logframe itself thus becomes 
a more nuanced management and reporting tool, reflecting implementation 
distinctions. 
In the fluid, less rigid world of programs in development contexts, the best 
a logframe can do is provide a snapshot of the program’s status at a certain point 
in time. If you have a series of logframes for the same program, you see a series 
of snapshots for this program. In a dynamic, shifting world filled with individu­
als and institutions driven by their own agendas and objectives, such as multiple 
partners on a water infrastructure program, a program’s progress cannot be ad­
equately captured when it is corralled by a program logic developed and debated 
in an office a continent away. To determine how a program has implemented its 
activities or processes and how these have led to changes in people’s lives, you 
don’t need a tool; you need a toolbox. In the present example, using the ToC and 
the logframe in an integrated supportive manner permits insights into program 
progress, challenges, and refinements, giving more granular detail of what works, 
what does not, and why. 
Moreover, the case also illustrates how the issue of perverse incentives is a 
challenge that pervades programs, which are bound to immoveable logframe 
targets. Programs allocate signifi cant effort and resources to achieving targets, 
sometimes with little thought to the rationale or story underlying program design 
or activity implementation. A complementary use of a logframe and a ToC may 
go some way to reducing the tendency to take advantage of perverse incentives. 
In the example of the water infrastructure program provided above, by using the 
ToC as a framework to determine how a target is reached, the program might de­
termine that in spite of high numbers of reach to institutions, the depth of impact 
on these institutions is not as effective as envisaged. A number of mid-course cor­
rections could be proposed: to reduce the quantity of organizations being reached 
but increase the opportunity for impact; or to recognize that the impact will be 
influenced by a range of factors beyond the control of the program and decide to 
reach as many organizations as possible, recognizing the limited impact; or to try 
to influence some factors currently beyond program control to increase impact on 
the already identified organizations. Each scenario would map a slightly diff erent 
path of the ToC and would require viewing the logframe targets through diff erent 
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lenses. When reviewed together, the harmonization of the two tools’ stories would 
present a more textured program history. 
If one deliberates on these nuances, the opportunities for program (and 
sector) learning are enhanced. A retroactive overview of program documenta­
tion would illustrate that the program opted to engage with a specifi c range 
of institutions for a variety of reasons, rather than to try and meet all of the 
potential organizations’ needs. How much more valuable would this be than a 
report stating that a program achieved a numerical target? A future iteration 
of the program, or another initiative in a similar field, might take this lesson 
on board and build institutional variance into its design, potentially making it 
more effective and effi  cient. 
As the example illustrates, the integration of logframes and theories of change 
may serve well to more accurately track program implementation rationale, give 
more substance and credence to program targets, and promote a more textured 
and accurate program history. The challenges, then, for program designers, do­
nors, funders, implementers, and evaluators can be framed by the following 
questions: 
• 	 How to build the complementarity of the tools at each stage of the pro­
gram, from conceptualization through to design and implementation? 
• 	 How to draw on both tools to supplement and complement the informa­
tion contained in the other? 
Informed by the integration of logframes and ToCs in the preceding case, we pro­
pose five steps that can be taken to advance this type of integration. Th e purpose 
of these suggested actions, developed on the basis of a real-world example, is to 
provide food for thought and a possible scaffolding for integrating the program 
tools in other contexts, rather than to prescribe a blueprinted process. 
Step one: Recognize the distinct purposes of each tool 
 Th e first step toward a stronger integration is for various stakeholders to un­
derstand the purpose and functionality of both tools, as well as their respective 
strengths and weaknesses. Logframes are generally well understood in terms 
of purpose and reporting, but their weaknesses might be less explicit. We have 
already mentioned a few of these weaknesses above, including unidimensional 
measurement and an assumed logic that imposes itself through implementation. 
 Theories of change, in contrast, are less well understood but are common par­
lance in international development circles, with appropriate defi nitions, purposes, 
and uses regularly being debated. Aside from the weaknesses that can arise from 
this lack of clear parameters (something that the logframe, by its very structured 
nature, has managed to eliminate), we need to understand that a theory of change 
takes as its background the social, economic, political, and cultural characteristics 
of the program environment and tries to distil the most pertinent aspects that 
either will be influenced by or will influence the program. 
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Step two: Recognize that in spite of their diff erent purposes, 
the tools can be used in a complementary fashion 
Program implementers (and donors) need to move away from reliance on the 
logframe to measure success and perhaps instead take to heart the common ad­
age, “Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can 
be counted counts.” The planned impact that the program has on the targeted 
population is important and is reflected in logframe reporting. The way in which 
this impact is implemented and its intended and unintended consequences are 
similarly important, but this process cannot be quantitatively measured and re­
flects a different facet of the program’s success. 
Programs report regularly on their progress. In many cases, changes to or 
implications of the planned implementation are explained, sometimes in great 
detail. Donors have often been participants in this ongoing conversation and agree 
with the recorded decision. However, rarely are these changes or implications 
mapped against the program theory of change, with alternatives (and their impli­
cations) to the planned route explained. If we intend developmental programs to 
be replicable or to learn from their failure, then recording these decisions should 
receive more attention. “How?” and “Why?” should be asked and answered regu­
larly and should have similar weight to the current refrain of “How many?” and 
“How much?” 
Step three: Seek complementarity at the outcome level 
In the water infrastructure example, program outcomes request quantifi able 
proof of institutional initiatives. However, as mentioned, there is a range of insti­
tutional capacities with which the program is working, increasing the complexity 
of achieving these targets. The program might choose to work with the easier but 
less strategic organizations. Or it might work with more demanding and more 
strategic institutions. As a result, it might fail to achieve its logframe targets but 
lay solid groundwork for future institutional arrangements. Should the program 
“fail” for choosing a more difficult but more considered institutional partnership? 
 These options of either working with more diffi  cult but strategically more 
important organizations or choosing the easier “low hanging fruit” (and the im­
plications of such a choice) need to be recorded. One of the places to do so is in 
aligning the logframe outcomes with the program theory of change, providing a 
map of alternative routes and explaining the choice to follow one over the other. 
Step four: Revise the tools in tandem 
To gain any benefit from the complementarity of the tools, they should be brought 
into play at the same time, both for reporting and for revision. One way of ensur­
ing this is to regularly review the theory of change, at least as often as the log-
frame—annually for many programs. The tools need to be finalized in conjunction 
with one another, and changes to one tool should be checked for implications 
against the other. While one small change might not need a corresponding change 
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on the second, a series of small changes, incremental on their own, might have a 
profound impact on the second tool. 
During the review process, we need to ascertain whether the planned theory 
of change was followed, whether the program was influenced or was an infl uencer, 
and the implications of these for the program’s quantifiable targets, recording any 
deviations to the planned process. Similarly, a logframe review of the program’s 
progress should try to uncover reasons for achievement (or under- or overa­
chievement) and map these answers to the theory of change. Questions such as “At 
what point did we realize that ...?” and “Did this decision help (or hinder). . . .?” 
begin to weave the reviews together. 
In some cases, decisions reflecting questions like these may lie buried in 
program progress reports or meeting minutes, justifying a particular decision, 
but the surrounding context and reasons (and dissenting opinions) might not be 
recorded or reflected in the program theory of change. As a result, at the end of 
a program, when we ask, “How did we end up here?,” we have little institutional 
memory on which to draw, weakening our evaluation with statements starting 
with “it is possible” and “we reasonably suggest.” 
 Step five: Call for both tools to present evidence when 
making strategic decisions 
 This, we think, will possibly be the most difficult step for both implementers 
and donors to adopt. But it might also be the most important. Quantifi able in­
dicators often drive decisions regarding success and failure. We do not deny the 
importance of these indicators but rather point out that in some cases, alternative 
quantifiable indicators can be presented, if the opportunity arises. Programs not 
achieving set targets have been closed when, in some cases, alternative options 
of quantifiable targets could have been considered. Instead of building on these 
“alternative successes,” closed programs negate the sunk costs of infrastructure 
and undermine the irrecoverable costs of established relationships. 
Development programs regularly need to make strategic decisions about 
their future—to expand, withdraw, close out, extend a timeframe, and so on. Some 
of these decisions require evidence of progress, provided by logframe reporting. 
What is often not called upon to lend context and colour to the stark numbers is 
progress (or the lack thereof) against the theory of change. At worst, calling for 
and reviewing this evidence in parallel to logframe evidence would provide no 
added value. At best, an extra source of substantiated explanatory evidence would 
add value to the process, give alternative explanations, and possibly provide alter­
native options for the decision makers. 
Given the number of international development programs that are currently 
underway, we should regularly ask a range of questions of them. During program 
implementation we often ask, “How fast did we get here?” and “How much did it 
cost?” Only on completion do we think about “Was that the best route?” and “Is 
this our planned destination?” We suggest that we might want to ask ourselves 
these (and other) questions more often during implementation, as well as on 
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program completion, and that one way of doing so might be to use program 
management and evaluation instruments as complementary tools providing re­
lated evidence to better serve our ultimate developmental goal. Toward this end, 
stakeholders, from donors to designers to implementers, need to understand the 
purpose of both tools and to call on their use, in order, in the case of the imple­
menters, to report against progress, and in the case of the donors, to hold the 
implementers to account. 
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Development programs take place in complex environments, and developmen­
tal goals are growing in complexity and interconnectedness. Yet the tools we use 
to plan, monitor, report on, and evaluate these same programs are stand-alone 
and static, some little evolved from their initial debut almost 50 years ago. As 
planners, as donors, as implementers, and as evaluators, in our commitment to 
development we should recognize the limitations that these tools impose and 
seek to overcome them. One possibility is to view the tools diff erently. Rather 
than seeing them as authorities to which the program must prostrate itself, we 
should view them as collaborative and supportive tools that the program can 
utilize in parallel in order to more fully document and explain its implementa­
tion. Used collaboratively, a program logframe and its theory of change can 
track not only the progress and speed at which a program is travelling but also 
its direction and whether it has encountered a more scenic route. Th e fi ve steps 
we outline above suggest one method of establishing this collaborative working 
relationship. 
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